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Since Robert Dahl coined the concept polyarchy, several attempts were made to 
develop indices that aim to measure citizens’ political participation in a given polity. 
The present paper evaluates these efforts and shows that most of them equal the 
mentioned dimension to the extension of suffrage. This considerably “thin” notion of 
participation has been criticized and was later enriched by other elements, most 
notably measures of voter turnout. With the growing number of works that 
catalogue and examine different processes of direct democracy, it is possible to 
further improve these indicators. This paper is an initial attempt to build an index 
that takes into consideration voter turnout and processes of direct democracy in an 
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Social scientists concerned with the task of measuring abstract concepts face several 
difficulties. As empirical or scientific enterprises2, their theories must be based on 
definitions that are not only open to questioning, but to transformation. In the exact 
sciences, a theory is a collection of theorems that asserts something about the 
tangible world and that can be tested empirically within given limits of accuracy. A 
theorem, on its turn, is an assemblage of propositions that are logically derived from 
other propositions and definitions. The validity of these theorems is assured by other 
theorems, which are themselves a consequence of other theorems… These 
propositions are reducible until they reach a basic proposition for which one does 
not need evidence, as its meaning is assumed and the terms that describe it are 
plain3. The mentioned empirical test is made through the analysis of certain 
variables, rigorously defined and accurately quantified. Thus, in the mechanics of 
motion, all theories are related to three kinds of quantities (length, time and mass) 
that present no disputes regarding their definitions and measurement methods. In 
chemistry, substances are known by their properties, whose definitions comprehend 
measurements in the classical terms of physics. Therefore an unequivocal collection 
of measurable variables is available to scientists dealing with exact disciplines, 
enabling them to develop propositions related to how the observed elements 
interact and depict “reality” (RAPOPORT, 1958, p. 973-978). 
 
When social scientists emulate this approach while constructing theories, an 
important issue pervades their explanations: “to assume that entities called politics, 
society, power, […] etc., actually exist, just as cats, icebergs, […] and grains of wheat 
exist, and that each has an essence discoverable by proper application of reason and 
observation” (RAPOPORT, 1958, p. 979-980). In the social sciences, the problem, 
more precisely, does not reside in the existence of these entities, but in the 
                                                           
1  This is a work in progress and is receiving financial support from the Fundação de 
Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (Fapesp). A previous version of it was 
presented at the 1st IPSA-ECPR Joint Conference, held on February 16-19th, 2011 in Sao 
Paulo, Brazil. The author wishes to thank the comments received on that occasion, 
especially those from the chairs of the panel on direct democracy, Rolf Rauschembach 
and Uwe Serdült. Additional comments are welcome and can be sent to 
tiago.peterlevitz@usp.br. 
2  “I shall certainly admit a [theoretical] system as empirical or scientific only if it is 
capable of being tested by experience” (POPPER, 2002, p. 18). 
3  Accordingly, for Wittgenstein (1981), “propositions are truth-functions of 
elementary propositions” and “an elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself” 
(prop. 5, p. 103).  
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consensus behind the definition of a concept in a specific manner and, furthermore, 
in the ways in which it can be measured. 
 
Notwithstanding these adversities, and unlike cats, icebergs and grains of wheat, the 
meanings of many social science concepts are also subject to change. This poses an 
additional challenge, as “men are not permanently imprisoned in the framework of 
(often inherited) concepts they use; they can not only break out of this framework 
but can create a new one, better suited to the needs of the occasion” (MERTON, 
1968, p. 146).  
 
Certainly that is the case of the concept “political participation”. For this specific 
form of participation, we mean, following Verba, Nie and Kim (1978), “those legal 
activities [undertaken] by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at 
influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take” 
(p. 46).  
 
Several attempts were made to develop indices that try to measure diverse 
understandings of the referred concept. These efforts tried to tackle the difficulties 
mentioned above in two ways4. One group of works sought to produce data 
specifically for this enterprise, developing surveys which would capture the behavior 
of their respondents through interviews and questionnaires5. The assessment of 
participation6 carried out in these researches focuses on citizens’ attitudes such as 
signing petitions, taking part in public demonstrations, etc. As conventional electoral 
participation generally is not comprised, they could be subsumed by the label non-
electoral studies. Given the amount of resources needed, few analyses that have 
adopted this perspective covered more than a handful of countries7. The most 
known works that have pursued it and still examined a considerably large cross-
                                                           
4  There is a vast research field, which does not face the measurement issues 
stated above, dedicated to explain why some people cast votes, while others do not. 
Albeit concerned with political participation, it aims essentially at elucidating differences 
in voter turnout rates. Achievements of this literature are examined in Blais (2006) and 
Geys (2006). On its turn, this paper is interested in the concept political participation 
itself and, as we shall see, in its relations with democratic theory.  
5  For a review of early works of this kind, see Conway (1991). 
6  In accordance to the employed definition, all references made to the term 
“participation” in this paper are extraneous to instances unrelated to political 
participation.   
7  The goal of some of these studies, as made explicit by one of them, was “not 
determining whether there is more [participatory] activity in one nation than in 
another”. They were “interested in comparing across nations in terms of the internal 
distribution of activity within each and in terms of the forces that shape that internal 
distribution" (VERBA et al., 1978, p. 50).  
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national sample of cases are the ones made by Inglehart and associates through the 
World Values Surveys (INGLEHART, 1977, 1990, 1997; INGLEHART & WELZEL, 2005) 
and the ones conducted by the regional Barometers (Latin, European, Arab, etc).  
 
Another group of works has tried to evaluate political participation based on 
electoral data easily found for a large number of countries. Not only the availability8 
of this kind of information but also its presumed objectivity and the relevance of 
these institutions for most political systems have made this approach preferred by 
mainstream democratic theorists, who, after Dahl (1956, 1971), have paid increasing 
attention to the concept in question. Studies that embrace this perspective could be 
entitled electoralists and usually employ a narrower conception of participation, 
restricting it to the act of voting. The present paper wishes to contribute to this line 
of inquiry, which will be examined in more depth below, arguing that data on 
processes of direct democracy can be used to enrich current efforts to measure 
political participation. In our concluding comments we will return and address some 




2. Democratic theory, political participation and processes of direct 
democracy  
 
For many years the study of participation was not taken into consideration by 
democratic theory. The Schumpeterian view of democracy, which became dominant 
in social sciences after the end of the Second World War (HELD, 2006, p. 141; RICCI, 
1970, p. 241-242), placed just one dimension – competition – as its defining 
characteristic. As late as 1967, some researchers were skeptical about the 
possibilities of measurement of a concept such as polyarchy, coined by Dahl (1956) 
more than a decade before. 
 
Of course political scientists' interest in democracy includes more than the 
existence and maintenance of democratic institutions. Two lines of further 
refinements have relied upon system-level democratic "behaviors" to make 
additional distinctions among political systems with democratic institutions. 
One of these developments deals with Dahl's concept of polyarchy, the 
other with political equality. While extremely meaningful, these concepts 
require much ingenuity to operationalize, especially on a cross-national 
level (MCCRONE & CNUDDE, 1967, p. 73). 
 
                                                           
8  After all, “theoretic interest tends to shift to those areas in which there is an 
abundance of pertinent statistical data” (MERTON, 1968, p. 168).  
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The modernization theories being developed at that time9, in their attempts to 
measure democracy, slowly embraced a Dahlian perspective and so considered 
assessments of both contestation and participation in their investigations. Perhaps 
Neubaer (1967) was the first scholar who tried to evaluate empirically a conception 
of political participation within this branch of literature, task that was undertaken 
later by others (BANKS, 1970; JACKMAN, 1973; WINHAM, 1970).  
 
Neubauer’s and many other studies (ARAT, 1991; FREEDOM HOUSE, 2006; 
HADENIUS, 1992; JACKMAN, 1973) used the extension of suffrage as the only proxy 
for gauging participation10. While this option was clearly an advance considering 
previous works, it was also subject to criticism. What was being measured, one could 
have argued, was just the potential participation of citizens in politics, which would 
not correspond to the effective situation this concept was supposed to portray. 
Several kinds of restrictions, both formal and informal, can be inflicted on 
populations already enfranchised and would impair assessments that do not account 
for information revealing the current state of affairs on the topic.        
 
The solution to this issue was to bring in voter turnout data, task that was performed 
by the indicator of Vanhanen (2000, 2002). But this decision also poses some 
difficulties. Two methods are usually found in studies dealing with this kind of 
information. The percentage of voters that indeed participate in elections can refer 
to the amount of people who, according to their age, were supposedly allowed to 
vote. Such data depends on censuses that might be conducted at considerable 
intervals not coincident with elections, giving rise to accuracy problems. This option 
would also underestimate turnout rates due to difficulties in distinguishing 
enfranchised from non-enfranchised citizens (like foreigners, some criminal convicts, 
etc.). As an alternative, it is also possible to relate voter turnout measures to the 
number of citizens who are formally registered to participate in a specific election. 
But choosing this second approach would also bias the results, because in some 
                                                           
9  For more information about this literature, see Diamond (1992) and Przeworski 
and Limongi (1997). 
10  Many of the mentioned works also scrutinize whether citizens are able to (i.e., 
have the possibility of) participate in politics through demonstrations, freely express 
their ideas, etc. Although these activities are related to non-electoral forms of political 
participation, they can be examined as part of concerns dealing with individual rights 
(both civil and political) and, for that, as belonging to issues related to other democratic 
dimensions such as those referring to competition and rule of law. As all these 
dimensions tend to overlap considerably, an important task of researchers whose aim is 
measurement is to clearly delimitate them, in order to avoid problems of redundancy. 
On the subject, see Goertz (2006, p. 106-109) and Munck and Verkuilen (2009, p. 21-23). 
Our decision to employ a considerably narrow conception of participation was taken 
bearing in mind these issues.  
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countries there are many unregistered segments of the population11. There is no 
easy escape from these problems, especially while handling several cases. 
Theoretically, if participation is considered a proxy for popular sovereignty – a crucial 
idea to democratic theory –, census related data, as it covers all adult population, 
would be more adequate than information related to registered voters (BOLLEN, 
1980, p. 373). In this paper we will use the former, as most specialized voter turnout 
studies do (GEYS, 2006, p. 639), acknowledging the referred issues.    
 
Problems regarding the comparison of countries in which voting is compulsory with 
others in which it is optional are also important. The literature shows that 
mandatory voting laws increase turnout rates by around 10 to 15 points, depending 
on their enforcement (BLAIS, 2006, p. 112-113). For democratic theory, the question 
of whether or not these laws add to the “democraticness” of a country is highly 
controversial. Some argue that the bigger the number of voters, the more 
representative and democratic is an election (LACROIX, 2007; LIJPHART, 1997). 
Others say that obliging citizens to vote is not democratic at all (JAKEE & SUN, 2006; 
LEVER, 2010). As the theme being analyzed here is participation and not properly 
democracy, both types of countries can be compared leaving aside these normative 
questions12.  
 
Besides the extension of suffrage and voter turnout measures, an electoralist view of 
participation can be further enriched with the assessment of processes of direct 
democracy (PDD). The worldwide usage of these mechanisms is increasing: their 
frequency today almost doubled when compared to 50 years ago (ALTMAN, 2011, p. 
65)13. Hence evaluations of citizen’s participation in politics should try to reflect their 
growing involvement with these democratic instruments. Specially because contrary 
to other non-electoral participatory institutions, such as those experiences dealing 
with city master plans, health councils, participatory budgeting, etc, which for their 
diversity are yet to be catalogued and examined in a comprehensive comparative 
manner14, PDD have been studied systematically and some databases are available 
to researchers working with large cross-national data.  
                                                           
11  Some analyses of the United States (POWELL, 1986; ROSENSTONE & 
WOLFINGER, 1978) show that registration requirements considerably reduce voter 
turnout. 
12  In other words, it is not a problem to our investigation if compulsory voting laws 
contribute to (or, to some, distort) voter turnout results. As Bollen (1990) puts it, 
discussing alternative democracy indices, “voter turnout may be a better measure of 
political participation, a concept that should be studied in its own right” (p. 14).  
13  Altman’s definition of PDD is a little bit different from ours, which will be 
presented below. 
14  Although there are several works comparing different practices of such 
institutions, e.g., Avritzer (2009), Isunza Vera and Gurza Lavalle (2010) and Sintomer, 




The addition of PDD to the assessment of political participation has been done just 
by Vanhanen (2002). His Index of Democratization (ID) covers the period from 1810 
to 2000 and espouses a Dahlian conception of democracy, gauging competition and 
participation. For the last two years of his database (1999 and 2000), he started to 
consider an evaluation of what he calls “referendums”. Prior to 1999, participation 
was simply measured as being equal to voter turnout rates15 calculated for 
parliamentary or presidential elections, depending on how power was divided. If a 
country presented concurrent powers (like the semi-presidential French Fifth 
Republic16), equal weight (50%) was given to both elections. The participation score 
could range from 0 to 70, the latter being the limit given even to cases that 
surpassed it. For 1999 and 2000, the same scoring procedure was followed, but the 
occurrence of a state or national referendum would add 1 or 5 points, respectively, 
to the year they took place. The impact of referendums was limited to 30 points for a 
specific year and the combined percentage of both voter turnout and referendums 
also could not exceed 70 points (VANHANEN, 2002, p. 1-2). 
 
Vanhanen’s measurement of participation can be criticized on several grounds. 
These issues will be addressed below, together with the decisions pertaining to the 
construction of our own index. 
 
 
3. Adding processes of direct democracy to an assessment of political 
participation 
 
Limiting the points attributed to voter turnout measures, Vanhanen improperly 
hinders the comparison of countries that present high values on this matter. In his 
evaluation, for instance, a country that had a turnout rate of 70% would be given the 
same score as another that had 90%. The present work did not place any restrictions 
on this matter. Also, while Vanhanen used several different sources for voter 
turnout, what raises some comparability issues, we relied only on the International 
IDEA Voter Turnout database17, which presents data for elections that were 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Herzberg and Röcke (2008), there is not any study or database presenting worldwide 
information about them. Existing studies are based on the experience of just a small 
number of cases or on a specific regional context.  
15  As relative to census data.  
16  Or, quite oddly, Brazil after 1985.  
17  See López Pintor and Gratschew (2002) for more details about the database. As 
it did not provide information about Colombia, only for this country we used data from 
another source (BUSHNELL, 2007, p. 450-451).   
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considered competitive18. Hence our sample is constrained to countries regarded as 
somewhat democratic by this organization, what is not a problem as their criterion 
for that is considerably generous. Furthermore,  several researchers (BOLLEN, 1980, 
p. 373; HADENIUS, 1992, p. 41; MUNCK & VERKUILEN, 2009, p. 25) contest the use of 
turnout figures when dealing with authoritarian regimes.  
 
Our study as well as Vanhanen’s disregards the extension of suffrage. As argued 
above, voter turnout rates account for citizen’s effective participation in politics, 
while the share of population that is able to vote reflects the potential side of it. But 
as the employed turnout measures are related to census data, they already take into 
consideration the number of adults that supposedly should be enfranchised. If voting 
is not allowed to some segments of the population, this would result in lower 
turnout rates.   
 
Additionally, what was meant by referendums was not explained by Vanhanen, thus 
his study does not differentiate between the several possible types of PDD. As the 
terminology of PDD varies considerably, not only between countries in which they 
are used, but also across the literature dedicated to the subject, it is important to 
clearly define what do we mean by the term and, therefore, what will be examined 
in this assessment. By processes of direct democracy we refer, following Kaufmann, 
Büchi and Braun (2010, p. 196), to electoral instruments through which citizens can 
vote and directly decide on substantive issues. Thus our conception of PDD includes 
mechanisms such as bottom-up procedures, which are triggered by citizens 
themselves, and also top-down procedures, which originate from the political 
establishment (i.e., by the executive or legislative branches or by mandatory 
legislation) (ALTMAN, 2011, p. 8)19. This understanding of PDD does not account for 
recall elections, as these instances are related to governments – not to substantive 
issues – and for that they can be considered as dealing with representative 
democracy (and not with direct democracy) (KAUFMANN et al, 2010, p. 196; 
RAUSCHENBACH, 2010, p. 5). This study also does not comprehend nonbinding PDD 
as well as legislative popular initiatives, as with their usage voters actually do not 
decide on the issues at stake, leaving matters to be settled by official authorities20. 
                                                           
18  For the organization, “there was a degree of competitiveness” when “more than 
one party contested the elections, or one party and independents contested the 
elections, or the election was only contested by independent candidates” (LÓPEZ 
PINTOR & GRATSCHEW, 2002, p. 10).  
19  Usually the mechanisms fitting the first group are called referendums, while the 
ones belonging to the second are entitled plebiscites. But we prefer using the terms 
“bottom-up” and “top-down” to identify them, as Altman does, in order to avoid 
nomenclature problems with the diverse terms employed in the literature.     
20  This is the reason why the referred procedures can be qualified as “populist 
placebos” (ALTMAN, 2011, p. 7).  
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Albeit PDD seem to be more developed at the local rather than at the national level 
(KAUFMANN et al, 2010, p. 110; MITTENDORF, 2007, p. 214), this work will only 
focus on the latter, meaning that just nationwide procedures will be evaluated.  
 
Vanhanen’s source for PDD was mainly Keesing's Record of World Events, which is 
not dedicated to collect this specific kind of information, unlike current databases21 
such as the one used here, produced by the Centre for Research on Direct 
Democracy (C2D)22. Another issue is that, as stated above, PDD were only considered 
for the last two years of Vanhanen’s work, hence participation scores during this 
period tend to be higher. Also, no justification was given to the points attributed to 
these mechanisms. The present work, after qualifying all PDD recorded by the 
referred database as being bottom-up or top-down procedures, found that the latter 
were twice more common than the former during the period covered by our 
analysis. Based on this frequency, bottom-up PDD were given twice the weight of 
top-down PDD, as the former can be considered more participatory as they are 
initiated by citizens themselves. 
 
Direct and indirect democracy should be seen as complementary23. Since thinkers 
such as Rousseau and Montesquieu asserted the incompatibility between 
sovereignty and representation, many democratic theorists have chosen one over 
the other. But the instances in which PDD are used worldwide are mainly (and 
increasingly) concentrated in representative democracies (ALTMAN, 2011, p. 69-70). 
The “opposite of representation is not participation: the opposite of representation 
is exclusion. And the opposite of participation is abstention” (PLOTKE, 1997, p. 24)24. 
Hence, an assessment of political participation should reflect this association. For 
                                                           
21  The databases available to researchers are discussed in Mittendorf (2007). 
22  C2D considers a unique direct democracy process every decision made on 
substantive issues by popular vote. This means that if one referendum addresses three 
different questions, such mechanism is registered as three different PDD.      
23  “The distinction between direct and indirect politics opens up promising paths of 
interpretation rather than creating obstacles, since it frames the institutional and 
sociocultural spaces within which the various components of political action take shape 
– from opinion and will formation to voluntary participation in movements, 
contestation, voting, and decision-making. […] Participation and representation [are not] 
alternative forms of democracy but […] related forms constituting the continuum of 
political judgment and action in modern democracies” (URBINATI, 2006, p 3). 
24  This complementarity is voiced by many others in the literature about direct 
democracy (ALTMAN, 2011, p. 2; BUTLER & RANNEY, 1994, p. 21; INTERNATIONAL IDEA, 
2008, p. 19; MENDELSOHN & PARKIN, 2001, p.4; RAUSCHENBACH, 2010, p. 5). For 
arguments against and counter-arguments in favor of the use of PDD within 
representative democracies, see Budge (2001), Butler and Ranney (1994), Setälä (1999, 
chap. 4) and Walker (2003, chap. 6).  
C2D Working Paper Series 39/2011 
 
9 
that this work, while evaluating the referred concept yearly for the countries 
covered by our sample, added a score for each PDD held in a given year. Although 
this logical operation is supported theoretically, its weighting is not. Because of this 
issue it was necessary to arbitrarily stipulate a value (more on this below) which 
would bestow PDD a certain importance in relation to the other variable (voter 
turnout). Thus we chose that every bottom-up PDD could add 25% to a country’s 
annual participation score. Top-down PDD could account for an addition of 12.5%. 
These increases were blocked if the participation score reached 1 (that is, 100%) and 
were weighted according to voter turnout measures displayed by a country in its 
previous national elections25. This means that four occurrences of bottom-up PDD or 
eight of top-down PDD could grant the same score as the event of one “regular” 
election. The relationship among these elements could be considered as one of 
substitutability, in which “the absence of one dimension can be compensated by the 
presence of other dimensions” (GOERTZ, 2006, p. 45). When evaluating 
participation, citizen’s low turnout rates in one election can be compensated by 
more occasions on which people are able to express themselves politically26. Thus 
they should be aggregated by addition. The overall rationale of our measurement 
procedure is shown below.  
 
PPS = VT + (b-uPDD * VT * 0.25) + (t-dPDD * VT * 0.125) 
 
For a given year, a country’s political participation score (PPS) is equal to the addition 
of three elements: its voter turnout rate (VT); the product of the number of 
instances in which bottom-up PDD (b-uPDD) occurred, the voter turnout rate and 
0.25; and the product of the number of instances in which top-down PDD (t-dPDD) 
occurred, its voter turnout rate and 0.125.  
 
Following Vanhanen (2000, 2002), voter turnout rates related to legislative or 
presidential elections were considered, respectively, for parliamentary or 
presidential countries. Equal weight (50%) was given to both elections in the cases of 
semi-presidential countries27. These regimes were identified according to the 
                                                           
25  This procedure was employed as there are several missing information for 
turnout data concerning PDD and also because C2D recorded them as a percentage of 
the registered electors (and this work uses turnout information related to census data). 
In our dataset, the average of voter turnout rates for “regular” elections was around 
70% and for PDD was around 50%. This implies that the scores given to PDD are a little 
bit overestimated.  
26  This compensation would not make sense if the concept being measured was 
democracy and not participation. The occurrence of several PDD in a dictatorship would 
not counteract the absence of elections 
27  For semi-presidential cases, when data for only one type of elections 
(presidential or parliamentary) were available, only they were taken into consideration. 
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dataset developed by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2009)28. Voter turnout scores 
were assigned only to years in which elections were held and were extended until 
another took place. This is reasonable as “the way in which a government originates 
continues to be a characteristic that affects its nature beyond the moment of its 
installation” (MUNCK, 2009, p. 152).     
 
Our sample comprises 107 countries, 824 “regular” elections, 555 top-down PDD and 
275 bottom-up PDD between the years of 1950 and 2000. Table 1 presents the 
yearly average of the political participation score for selected periods for the tenth 
best ranked countries. The full evaluation is displayed in the appendix.   
 
 
















1 Italy 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 
2 Switzerland 0.96 0.85 0.97 0.86 0.93 0.91 
3 New Zealand 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.91 0.85 0.90 
4 Belgium 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.84 0.87 
5 Iceland 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.88 0.84 0.87 
6 Austria 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.77 0.86 
7 Denmark 0.81 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.86 0.86 
8 Australia 0.84 0.86 0.89 0.87 0.84 0.86 
9 Netherlands 0.87 0.90 0.87 0.82 0.75 0.84 
10 Sweden 0.78 0.83 0.87 0.86 0.81 0.83 
 
 
As expected, countries in which voting was compulsory and that hosted a 
considerable amount of PDD, like Italy, figure in the top of the table. Switzerland, 
where voting is not mandatory, had its low turnout rates compensated by the many 
PDD that took place there. This case can be considered an outlier, as its citizens face 
a yearly average of 9.12 instances of PDD, accounting for 50% of the world’s usage of 
bottom-up PDD (ALTMAN, 2011, p. 73). Other countries like Liechtenstein, New 
Zealand, Ireland, Uruguay and Denmark also had their scores considerably enhanced 
                                                           
28  Except for the more recent periods of Mozambique (1994-2000), Russia (1993-
2000) and South Africa (1994-2000), which were identified by these authors as civilian 
dictatorships. We disagree on this classification and prefer to follow Siaroff (2003), who 
generally qualified these countries as semi-presidential.  
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by the occurrence of PDD. The table 2 presented next shows how these mechanisms 
increased the PPS of some countries.    
 
 
















1 Switzerland 0.34 0.30 0.54 0.46 0.56 0.44 
2 Liechtenstein 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.10 
3 New Zealand 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
4 Ireland 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04 
5 Uruguay 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
6 Denmark 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.03 
7 Australia 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 
8 Lithuania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.02 
9 Italy 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 
10 Slovakia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02 
11 France 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
12 Ecuador 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 
 
 
The introduction of PDD to the assessment of political participation adds information 
to the evaluation of the concept, producing finer distinctions between the studied 
units. If the case of Ireland is taken, for instance, in years in which this country did 
not hold PDD, the measurement of its electoral participation would equal its voter 
turnout rate. As is seen in figure 1 below, which depicts the PPS and voter turnout 
rates for Ireland in the decade of 1990, this happened in 1990, 1991, 1993 and 1994.  
 
In 1992 Ireland hosted 4 top-down PDD and as our scoring procedure limits the PPS 
to 1 (or 100%), this was the amount attributed to the year in question. From 1995 to 
1999 the country had more top-down PDD: two in 1998 and one in each of the 
remaining years, with scores distributed accordingly. If PDD were not considered in 
the analysis of participation, Ireland would present similar scores throughout the 
decade. This would not reflect what actually happened there: having quite stable 
voter turnout rates for the period, a score attributed to the participation of Irish 
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4. Provisional concluding remarks 
 
In the eighteenth century, Montesquieu asseverated that “a fundamental law in 
democracies [is] that the people should have the sole power to enact laws” 
(MONTESQUIEU, 1977, bk. II, chap. 2, p. 112, emphasis added). The French baron 
argued that a state in which citizens delegated their sovereignty rights (i.e., their 
entitlement to elaborate laws themselves) should be classified as presenting a mixed 
system of government. In this view, systems in which people are not sovereign 
should not be called democracies29. Rousseau, mainly in On the social contract30, was 
also radically against the representative system, as “sovereignty, being nothing less 
than the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated; and that the sovereign, 
who is no less than a collective being, cannot be represented except by himself: the 
power indeed may be transmitted, but not the will” (ROUSSEAU, 2003, bk. II, chap. I, 
p. 15). In the famous metaphor of the Genovese thinker, citizens living under 
representative governments would be slaves punctuated by moments of freedom, 
which were restricted only to the periods when elections were held.    
 
                                                           
29  “When the body of the people in a republic are possessed of the supreme 
power, this is called a democracy”. (MONTESQUIEU, 1977, bk. II, chap. 2, p. 112). 
30  Rousseau “went from a radical denial of representation in Du contrat social to 
the endorsement of delegation in the Project de constitution pour la Corse and the 
Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne” (URBINATI, 2006, .p. 62). 
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For these authors, democracy was associated with the governmental system found 
in some ancient city-states, most notably Athens between the fifth and fourth 
centuries before Christ31. The citizens’ possibility to propose laws themselves, as well 
as the selection of officials by lot, was central to these city-states (MANIN, 1997, p. 
11). Thus Montesquieu and Rousseau related the referred aspects to democracy, 
conferring an undemocratic character on representative politics. 
 
On the other hand, contemporary democracies are, as is often said, party 
democracies: it is difficult to imagine today any country being governed directly by 
its citizens. The understanding of representative democracy as a second best 
expedient to “pure” democracy is based on a sovereignty conception of the 
eighteenth century. Politics should not be reduced to contractual relations between 
agent and client, or elector and elected. Politics deals with judgment and beliefs, and 
the representative system, more than the Athenian model, allows citizens to 
transcend their specificities and “defines relationships of control (on the part of the 
represented) and responsibility (on the part of the representatives) that are 
eminently political and moral” (URBINATI, 2006, .p. 50). 
 
Both perspectives briefly discussed above can be used to support the current state 
of affairs in several contemporary countries, in which direct and indirect forms of 
democracy are present. And electoral assessments of participation should aim to 
evaluate these two sides of politics. But as reviewed in this study, almost all 
empirical democratic theorists focus only on the representative side of it. 
 
This work is an initial effort to fill this gap. We argued that political participation 
should be measured taking into consideration indicators related to voter turnout and 
PDD. The extension of suffrage should not be included in such an assessment if the 
employed voting data refer to censuses, as the figures that use the mentioned 
method already consider the number of citizens who should be able to vote. Voter 
turnout and PDD information are complementary and they can be logically 
aggregated by addition. But the main problem with our measurement is that these 
attributes were arbitrarily weighted. One could reasonably sustain that for 
contemporary representative democracies, “regular” elections are more important 
than PDD and that this should be reflected in any weighting scheme. But how 
relevant the latter would be compared to the former? This is an important issue for 
multidimensional measurements of concepts. As showed by Munck and Verkuilen 
(2009, p.30-35), some democracy indices (FREEDOM HOUSE, 2006; VANHANEN, 
2002, 2006) have their components aggregated assuming (not always consciously) 
that their components are equally important. Thus it was not necessary to attribute 
                                                           
31  “Athenian democracy begins with the (more or less mythical) reforms of Solon 
(ca. 580 B.C.) and ends with military defeat and the suppression of democracy in 322” 
(ELSTER, 1999, p. 259).   
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weights to their elements, although no justification was given to support such 
decision. The indicator of Coppedge and Reinicke (1991) tries to avoid this problem 
using a Guttman scale, but this procedure should not be used if the variables in 
question are uncorrelated, which is the case for them and for the present work. The 
Polity IV index (MARSHALL; GURR & JAGGERS, 2010) also arbitrarily weights its 
components. The occurrence of weighting problems in such widely used democracy 
rankings exposes the difficulties in tackling these adversities. Future versions of this 
study should try to handle these issues more appropriately. 
 
As we mentioned in the beginning of this investigation, this work embraces an 
electoralist view of participation. Therefore only elections were considered in it, 
whether they were related to direct or indirect forms of democracy. But nothing 
excludes the possibility of further enriching this approach, combining it with non-
electoral perspectives of participation. Some studies (NORRIS, 2002; BLAIS, 2010) 
indeed take into consideration both views, but in a separate manner (one at a time), 
without trying to aggregate these two perspectives.  
 
An assessment of participation espousing a comprehensive view of the concept 
would be less subject to criticisms by each of the perspectives above discussed. As 
“the evidence accumulated to date about the possibilities and effects of extensive 
participation is limited” (HELD, 2006, p. 214), these consequences could be better 
evaluated with the improvement of alternative measurement efforts, such as the 
present one. But the challenge of developing a more meaningful32 conception of 
participation is yet to be achieved. This study has tried only to thicken a considerably 















                                                           
32  “Thickness [...] adds meaning to a concept, but at expense of wide applicability. 
Thin concepts have more general applicability, but tell us less about the objects they 
describe” (COPPEDGE, 2007, p. 110). 
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1 Italy 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 
2 Switzerland 0.96 0.85 0.97 0.86 0.93 0.91 
3 New Zealand 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.91 0.85 0.90 
4 Belgium 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.84 0.87 
5 Iceland 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.88 0.84 0.87 
6 Austria 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.77 0.86 
7 Denmark 0.81 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.86 0.86 
8 Australia 0.84 0.86 0.89 0.87 0.84 0.86 
9 Netherlands 0.87 0.90 0.87 0.82 0.75 0.84 
10 Sweden 0.78 0.83 0.87 0.86 0.81 0.83 
11 Israel 0.77 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.81 
12 Germany 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.79 0.73 0.80 
13 Norway 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.83 0.76 0.80 
14 Ireland 0.74 0.75 0.84 0.80 0.78 0.78 
15 Finland 0.73 0.80 0.75 0.82 0.76 0.77 
16 United Kingdom 0.79 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.75 
17 Liechtenstein 0.81 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.67 0.74 
18 Greece 0.74 0.51 0.60 0.86 0.85 0.71 
19 France 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.70 
20 Japan 0.73 0.70 0.73 0.71 0.63 0.70 
21 Costa Rica 0.44 0.69 0.74 0.80 0.81 0.69 
22 Canada 0.70 0.72 0.66 0.67 0.62 0.67 
23 Malta 0.00 0.70 0.84 0.90 0.96 0.67 
24 Luxembourg 0.60 0.72 0.71 0.67 0.61 0.66 
25 United States 0.58 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.59 
26 Uruguay 0.57 0.67 0.10 0.66 0.97 0.59 
27 India 0.50 0.59 0.60 0.63 0.61 0.58 
28 Venezuela 0.00 0.66 0.80 0.75 0.55 0.54 
29 Turkey 0.00 0.73 0.55 0.69 0.80 0.54 
30 Trinidad and Tobago 0.00 0.67 0.45 0.72 0.69 0.50 
31 Argentina 0.46 0.28 0.22 0.63 0.81 0.48 
32 Sri Lanka 0.46 0.62 0.43 0.15 0.65 0.46 
33 Dominican Republic 0.00 0.39 0.66 0.62 0.55 0.44 
















34 San Marino 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.81 0.83 0.43 
35 Papua New Guinea 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.75 0.83 0.42 
36 Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.82 0.77 0.41 
37 Jamaica 0.00 0.59 0.70 0.27 0.49 0.40 
38 Mauritius 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.82 0.79 0.40 
39 Dominica 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.78 0.82 0.39 
40 Ecuador 0.26 0.14 0.13 0.59 0.76 0.37 
41 Chile 0.26 0.48 0.11 0.18 0.81 0.37 
42 Spain 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.77 0.77 0.37 
43 Bahamas 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.64 0.68 0.36 
44 Grenada 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.49 0.81 0.35 
45 Colombia 0.15 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.34 0.35 
46 Panama 0.50 0.36 0.00 0.11 0.69 0.34 
47 Saint Lucia 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.67 0.81 0.32 
48 Saint Vincent 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.73 0.75 0.31 
49 Bolivia 0.29 0.36 0.00 0.36 0.56 0.31 
50 Honduras 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.68 0.28 
51 Antigua and Barbuda 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.79 0.27 
52 Brazil 0.28 0.07 0.00 0.16 0.81 0.26 
53 Belize 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.26 
54 Nicaragua 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.77 0.25 
55 Kiribati 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.76 0.19 0.25 
56 Nauru 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.44 0.48 0.24 
57 Solomon 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.54 0.64 0.24 
58 Vanuatu 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.66 0.23 
59 Guatemala 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.11 0.31 0.21 
60 Thailand 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.56 0.19 
61 Mongolia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.88 0.19 
62 Peru 0.12 0.20 0.06 0.53 0.00 0.18 
63 Czech Republic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.81 0.18 
64 Bangladesh 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.64 0.18 
65 Slovenia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.16 
66 Nepal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.16 
67 South Korea 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.16 
68 Hungary 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.69 0.15 
69 Ghana 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.64 0.15 
70 Cape Verde 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.15 
71 Poland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.60 0.14 
72 Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.14 
73 Slovakia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.14 
















74 Russia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.14 
75 Lithuania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.13 
76 Latvia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.60 0.13 
77 Romania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.68 0.13 
78 Andorra 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.13 
79 Benin 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.13 
80 Cyprus 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.13 
81 Croatia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.13 
82 El Salvador 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.41 0.13 
83 Philippines 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.12 
84 S. Tome and Principe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.12 
85 Estonia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.51 0.12 
86 Paraguay 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.46 0.11 
87 South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.11 
88 Ukraine 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.10 
89 Fiji 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.09 
90 Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.09 
91 Mozambique 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.09 
92 Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.08 
93 Pakistan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.30 0.08 
94 Central African Rep. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.08 
95 Macedonia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.08 
96 Suriname 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.08 
97 Comoros 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.32 0.08 
98 Madagascar 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.07 
99 Malawi 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.07 
100 Armenia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.07 
101 Moldova 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.06 
102 Nigeria 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.06 
103 Niger 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.05 
104 Burundi 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.05 
105 Mali 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.04 
106 Kenya 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.03 
107 Palau 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02 
 
